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OPINION OF THE COURT

ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
Charles Sean Kruzits, an employee of Vincent M. Visco
d/b/a/ Vistek Industries ("Vistek"), filed a strict products
liability action against Okuma Machine Tool, Inc., manufacturer
of a lathe which Kruzits alleges caused him personal injuries,
and Heller Financial, Inc. ("Heller"), in the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County.

Heller financed the purchase of

the lathe and holds title to it for the sole purpose of
perfecting its security interest.

The defendants subsequently

removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
In the district court, Heller filed a third-party
complaint against Vistek seeking indemnification and defense
under the terms of their lease agreement.
judgment on the pleadings.
motion.

Heller appeals.1

Vistek moved for

The district court granted Vistek's
We reverse.
I.

Kruzits, an employee of Vistek, sustained injuries in
the course of his employment while operating a lathe manufactured
by Okuma Machine Tool, Inc.
1

He sued Heller and several other

. Heller filed its notice of appeal before the district court
certified its order as final under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 54(b). Thereafter, Vistek filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This court denied
Vistek's motion because the district court has certified its
order as final under Rule 54(b) and because there is no
indication that hearing this appeal will prejudice Vistek's
rights. See Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 921-923 (3d Cir.
1977).

defendants for compensation for his injuries.

Heller, who merely

financed the lathe but exercised no operational control over it,
took title to it, and leased it to Vistek pursuant to the
security lease agreement.
In the district court, Heller filed a third-party
complaint against Vistek, alleging that, under the terms of its
lease agreement, Vistek should defend and indemnify Heller in the
underlying action.

Vistek moved for judgment on the pleadings

contending that the language of the indemnity provision in the
lease agreement was not specific enough to overcome the immunity
which Vistek, as Kruzits' employer, asserted pursuant to the
Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Act ("PWCA"), 77 P.S. §
481(b).2
The district court granted Vistek's motion for judgment
on the pleadings, holding that the PWCA precluded Heller from
seeking indemnity from Vistek.

The court accepted Vistek's

2

.
Section 481(b) of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation
Act provides that:
In the event injury or death to an
employee [sic] is caused by a third party,
then such employee [sic]. . . may bring [an]
action at law against such third party, but
the employer . . . shall not be liable to a
third party for damages, contribution, or
indemnity in any action at law, or otherwise,
unless liability for such damages,
contributions or indemnity shall be expressly
provided for in a written contract entered
into by the party alleged to be liable prior
to the date of the occurrence which gave rise
to the action. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77,
§481(b) (1974).

argument that the indemnity provision in the lease agreement was
not specific enough to overcome Vistek's employer's immunity
under the PWCA.

The court rejected Heller's contention that

Illinois law should govern the interpretation of the indemnity
clause because of a choice of law provision in the lease
agreement.3

The court concluded that Pennsylvania law should

apply because Pennsylvania had a significant interest in the
underlying action which justified ignoring the contractual choice
of law provision.
This appeal only considers the issue of whether Heller
can successfully bring Vistek into the underlying action as a
third party defendant.
II.
This court exercises plenary review over district court
orders granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). See e.g., Jablonski v. Pan American
World Airways Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988).

Under Rule

12(c), we will not grant judgment on the pleadings "unless the
movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains
to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Id. (quoting Society Hill Civic Association v. Harris, 632
F.2d 1045, 1054 (3d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).
A.
3

. The choice of law provision of the security lease provides,
in pertinent part, that: "this lease will be governed by the
internal law and decisions . . . of the State of Illinois,
including all matters of construction, validity, enforceability,
and performance."

We must determine: first, whether Pennsylvania or
Illinois law controls the interpretation of the indemnity clause
of the lease agreement; and second, whether the indemnity clause
is enforceable under the applicable law.
A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must
apply the choice of law rules of the forum state. Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941); American Air
Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297, 1299 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1975).
Accordingly, we apply Pennsylvania choice of law rules in this
case.
Pennsylvania courts generally honor the intent of the
contracting parties and enforce choice of law provisions in
contracts executed by them.

Smith v. Commonwealth Nat. Bank, 557

A.2d 775, 777 (Pa. Super. 1989), appeal denied, 569 A.2d 1369
(Pa. 1990).

Pennsylvania courts have adopted section 187 of the

Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws which provides that:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the
parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied if the particular
issue is one which the parties could have
resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the
parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the
particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit
provision in their agreement directed to that
issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis
for the parties' choice, or

(b) application of the law of the
chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which
has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular
issue . . . .
See e.g., Schifano v. Schifano, 471 A.2d 839, 843 n. 5 (Pa.
Super. 1984) (citing with approval the Restatement, Second,
Conflict of Laws).
In this case, paragraph 21 of the lease agreement
specifically provides that the lease will be governed and
construed in all respects by the internal laws and decisions of
the State of Illinois.

Accordingly, Heller contends that the

choice of law provision in the lease agreement should be given
effect under the conflict of law rules of Pennsylvania.

In

particular, Heller argues that, because the issue of indemnity
was one which the parties could have and did resolve by an
explicit provision in their agreement, pursuant to the
Restatement, Second, the district court should have applied the
law chosen by the parties in construing the indemnity clause.
Vistek, on the other hand, argues that the district
court correctly applied Pennsylvania law because of
Pennsylvania's strong public policy interest in enforcing its

Workmen's Compensation Act.4

Vistek contends that Pennsylvania

law should govern because the underlying action involved a
Pennsylvania worker, the accident occurred in Pennsylvania and
the indemnity claim was against a Pennsylvania employer.
Vistek is correct about the character of the underlying
action and also that Pennsylvania has a strong interest in
protecting the terms of the PWCA, but Vistek misconstrues the
issue that this court must resolve.
the PWCA.

This case does not implicate

The immunity of the employer (Vistek) under the PWCA

does not affect the obligation of the lessee (also Vistek) to
defend and indemnify the lessor (Heller) from any liability under
the terms of its financial arrangement with Heller.
The agreement between Heller and Vistek is a freely
negotiated financing contract between two commercial entities.
Pennsylvania courts will only ignore a contractual choice of law
provision if that provision conflicts with strong public policy
interests. See e.g., Soxman v. Goodge, 539 A.2d 826 (Pa.Super,
1988); Leidy v. Desert Enterprises, Inc., 381 A.2d 164 (Pa.Super,
1977).
4

. Vistek also asserts on appeal that the lease agreement is
unenforceable because no one from Heller signed it. In response,
Heller argues that Vistek waived this issue by not raising it in
the district court. Furthermore, Heller contends that a signed
copy of the lease agreement does exist and has moved to
substitute a signed copy of the lease agreement for the unsigned
copy they initially provided.
This court will not consider an issue raised for the first time
on appeal absent a showing that a gross miscarriage of justice
will otherwise result. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United
States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1976). Therefore, we reject
Vistek's argument and deny Heller's motion as moot.

In this case, no strong public policy issues are
infringed.

This litigation has no effect on the employer's

rights and obligations under the PWCA and Kruzitz makes no claim
that the third party, Heller, caused his personal injury.

On the

other hand, Illinois, the chosen state, has "a substantial
relationship to the parties."

In the commercial world, where an

Illinois company, such as Heller, finances purchases of
commodities, machinery, and equipment in many, if not all, of the
states in the nation, it is understandable and reasonable that
Heller include choice of law provisions in its financial
agreements to ensure that those agreements are governed by the
law of its principal place of business rather than the laws of
each and every state where its borrowers do business.

We hold

that under Pennsylvania choice of law rules, contractual choice
of law provisions contained in a financial agreement that enables
an employer to purchase plant equipment is binding on the
parties.
B.
Because the contractual choice of law provision is not
superseded, Illinois law governs our interpretation of the
indemnity clause.

Vistek contends that the Illinois' courts

would reject the choice of law provision and apply Pennsylvania
law to the instant case because of Pennsylvania's strong interest
in enforcing the PWCA. See e.g., Lyons v. Turner Constr. Co., 551
N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (Ill.App. Ct. 1990) (court disregarded
contractual choice of law provision because applying the chosen
law was contrary to a fundamental state policy).

As discussed

above, this choice of law provision does not infringe on the PWCA
or any other important Pennsylvania interest.

Therefore, this

court looks to Illinois law to determine the effect of the
indemnity clause.
In general, Illinois courts will strictly construe
indemnity clauses. Sorrentino v. Waco Scaffolding & Shoring Co.,
358 N.E.2d 1244 (Ill.App. Ct. 1976).

However, "[i]n interpreting

a contract for indemnity, [Illinois] courts must give the
agreement a fair and reasonable interpretation based upon a
consideration of the agreement as a whole."

Allen v.

International Harvester Co., 571 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ill.App. Ct.
1991) (citations omitted); Smith v. Clark Equipment Co., 483
N.E.2d 1006, 1010 (Ill.App. Ct. 1985).

The courts

attempt to

determine and then implement the intention of the parties.
Higgins v. Kleronomos, 459 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (Ill.App. Ct. 1984).
The courts look to see if the indemnity clause
specifically and clearly provides for indemnification against the
particular underlying claims.

Sorrentino, 358 N.E.2d 1244;

Westinghouse Elec. Elevator Co. v. La Salle Monroe Building
Corp., 70 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ill. 1946), superseded by statutes on
other grounds, (court will not construe a contract to indemnify
for personal injuries to indemnify against the indemnitee's
negligence absent express contractual language).

The Illinois

court will enforce an indemnity clause if it is sufficiently
clear and specific.

Owens v. Midwest Tank and Mfg. Co., 549

N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ill.App. Ct. 1989).

Here the indemnity clause of the security agreement
plainly states:
13. Indemnity: [Vistek] does hereby
assume liability for and does agree to
indemnify, protect, save, and keep harmless
[Heller] from and against any and all
liabilities, losses . . . including attorneys
fees, court costs and legal expenses of
whatever kind or nature, imposed on, incurred
by, or asserted against [Heller] in any way
relating to or arising out of this Lease or
the manufacture, purchase, ownership,
delivery, lease, possession, use, operation,
condition, return or other disposition of the
equipment by [Heller] or [Vistek], . . . any
claim arising out of strict liability in
tort, and any taxes for which [Vistek] is
responsible hereunder. . . . (Emphasis
added).
Under Illinois law, this language is sufficient to
require Vistek to defend and indemnify Heller.

See e.g., Patton

v. T.O.F.C., Inc., 398 N.E.2d 313 (Ill.App. Ct. 1979) (where the
Appellate Court of Illinois enforced an indemnity clause which
contained language referring indirectly to strict products
liability claims).
The indemnity clause at issue in this case provides
that Vistek will assume liability for any claims arising out of
the use, operation or condition of the lathe and "any claims
arising out of strict liability in tort."

This clause contains a

direct reference to strict products liability claims and Vistek
must therefore indemnify Heller in the underlying action.
III.
Therefore, we hold that under Pennsylvania choice of
law rules, a choice of law clause in an equipment financing

agreement between an employer and a third party is not preempted
by the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, notwithstanding
the PWCA provisions granting immunity to an employer from
indemnity suits by third parties for claims against those third
parties arising out of an employee's injuries during the course
of employment.

We further hold that the indemnity clause is

enforceable under Illinois law and that Vistek must indemnify
Heller.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be
reversed and the case remanded with directions to reinstate
Heller's third-party complaint and for such further proceedings
as are consistent with this opinion.5
Costs taxed against the appellee.
__________________________

5

. On remand, the district may want to consider Nath v. National
Equipment Leasing Corp., 439 A.2d 633 (Pa. 1981) which held that
a finance lessor who is not in the business of selling or
marketing merchandise will not be liable in a strict products
liability action.

